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the risk-averse firm's production. These results depend on ftrms realizing that the prices of 
inputs required for production in subsequent periods are correlated with the prices of current 
output. 
There are two important implications of this work. First, empirical work should not 
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aversion. Secondly, one can rationalize previously unexplained real-world behavior such as 
the relative insensitivity of production and sales to current prices, and the spreading of sales 
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Few studies have relaxed Sandmo's (1971) implicit assumption that the fum plans to end 
production at the end of the current period. However, this assumption is crucial for some of the 
most important results of the theory of the finn under uncertainty. As we show later, under certain 
realistic circumstances a forward-looking risk-averse fum will produce more than a risk-neutral 
one, and an increase in the mean-preserving price spread will increase the risk-averse fum's 
production. 
There is at least one reason to expect the assumption of a single production cycle to matter. 
Consider an industry for which input and output prices are positively correlated and fums remain 
in production for several production cycles. Here, the firm's end-of-period cash flow includes the 
costs required to initiate production in the subsequent period.! Therefore, the positive effect of 
high output prices may be expected to be offset by higher input prices. In addition, having output 
to sell, even if produced at a loss, can act as a hedge against input prices. Firms operating in this 
environment will be concerned about revenue and cost risks at several points in time and may 
choose to offset risk in one period against risk in another and will have an opporrunity to diversify 
risk across time. 
Most of the existing literature on the topic assumes that fmns are concerned only with 
current period production and risk. But by assuming that firms behave myopically in this manner, 
the literature excludes by assumption the intertemporal diversification of risk that drives the results 
of this paper. Existing nonmyopic models have generally restricted utility to be intertemporally 
additive and prices to be independently distributed across time (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981, Hey 
1987). These are strong assumptions because intertemporal additivity implies perfect substirution 
among single-period utilities, and price independence is not supported by empirical research. 
Other work exists upon which we can build. Zabel (1971) uses a constant absolute risk-averse 
intertemporal utility function but assumes intertemporal price independence. Chavas (1988) 
presents a forward-looking mean-variance model of speculative storage. However, using the 
1 Note that there is no difference in real time between the end of one period and the beginning of the 
following period. 
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mean-variance paradigm in this setting is difficult to justify because the random storage function 
has a truncated distribution. 
In the next section, we introduce a forward-looking firm whose only productive activity is 
speculative storage (or asset holding). In this case, the correlation between input and output prices 
is most obvious and leads to a straightforward analysis of the finn's behavior. We also show that 
Sandmo-type behavior is nested within the more general model by restricting the finn to be 
myopic. Then, we allow the firm to be involved in a more standard productive activity and derive 
some propositions. The results for this more general case are derived at the cost of some additional 
assumptions about the technology set. 
I. A Speculative Storing Competitive Firm 
Consider a competitive finn with a twice continuously differentiable von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function and assume that utility is strictly concave in its argument tenninal 
wealth [U(WT), U'(WT) > 0, U"(WT) < 0].2 Tenninal wealth is 
where w, denotes monetary wealth at end of trading date t, Jt, is cash flow at time t, and r, equals 
one plus the one-period interest rate prevailing at t Interest rate need not be constant over time, but 
it is restricted to be nonrandom. At each trading date 0 $ t < T the finn can borrow and lend 
unlimited amounts of money for one period at the prevailing interest rate. 
It will become clear later that input price randomness plays a key role in the forward-
looking scenario, so that we want to account for it explicitly. But allowing for input price 
randomness renders the model intractable, as suggested by the related literarure (Batra and Ullah 
2As noted by Katz (1983). the proper argument of utility is wealth and not profits. although the larrer 
approach has been widely (and incorrectly) used. 
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1974, Hartman 1975, Ratti and Ullah 1976, Wright 1984, Stewart 1978). One way to tackle this 
problem is to postulate a speculative firm whose only activity is storing a product (or asset) to 
profit from its resale. In this instance, the relevant cash flow at any date is represented by 
where P, represents the quantity sold at date t, p, denotes the price at t, i(·) is a convex storage cost 
function such that i'(-) > Q,3 and I, is beginning inventory at date t. Positive sales means that the 
firm sells from beginning stocks, whereas negative sales means that the finn buys to store and sell 
at a later date. Sales cannot exceed beginning inventory (i.e., P, :s; I,). The amount(~- P,) is the 
unsold beginning inventory at date t, which is carried over at nonrandom storage cost i(I,- P,) to 
become beginning inventory at timet+ 1 ~+1). This kind of cash flow reduces the problem to its 
essentials and is generalized later. 
Assume that at any moment t the firm chooses current product sales (P ,) to maximize 
expected utility of tenninal wealth, given available information. The optimal sales level at the 
current date t = 0 is obtained by solving the following set of recursive equations 
where E,O denotes the expectation operator based on information available at t, P, = (p0, ••• , p,) is 
a vector containing past and current prices, and tenninal wealth and cash flows are given by (1.1) 
3for a risk-averse flii11, i"(·) = 0 yields a bounded solution. This is import.'lnt bec:lUse i"(·) = 0 is a quite 
common situation in the real world (for example. gold and common stock are most likely carried over at constant 
marginal storage cost). In contr:lSt. for a risk-neutral flii11 we need i"(·) > 0 for the solution to be bounded. 
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and (1.2), respectively. The solution to the problem summarized by expressions (1.3) and (1.4) 
can be obtained by recursively solving the Lagrangian functions 
where Tlr is the Lagrangian multiplier. 
The first-order conditions (FOCs) corresponding to the tenninal date Tare 
(1.7) 
(1.8) 
where MT' represents U' evaluated at the optimum. The first term of the derivative of the 
Lagrangian function with respect to sales is positive, hence the Lagrangian multiplier (Th) is also 
positive to satisfy (1.7). Because TlT > 0, df.yldr\T must equal zero to avoid violating the Kuhn-
Tucker condition (1.8). Therefore, the optimal sales policy at Tis to liquidate the inventories 
(e.g., PT =IT), the optimal cash flow reduces to 7t-r = PT IT, and the value function is 
For all dates prior to the terminal date (0 :S: t < T), the FOCs are (see Appendix A): 
a£ 
(1.10) apt = rt+l ... rT·l [r, (p, + i') M(- Et(Pr+l Mt+l')]- Tlr = 0 
t 
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where Mt' = Et(Mt+1') evaluated at the optimum corresponding to date t (note that Mt' > 0). The 
solution to (1.10) and (1.11) is a unique absolute consrrained maximum because the objective 
function is strictly concave and the consrraint set is convex.4 Expression (1.9) together with FOCs 
(1.10) and (1.11) provide the framework needed to analyze the forward-looking risk-averse fmn. 
A myopic firm is defmed as one whose planning horizon is the same as its decision 
horizon, which is equal to one period.5 This defmition of myopia leaves two possibilities: the firm 
is either at tenninal date T, or at time T-1. At T the fmn faces no risk; therefore, we focus on the 
behavior of the myopic fmn at date T-1. In concrast, a forward-looking (or nonrnyopic) fmn is 
characterized by a planning horizon that consists of at least two decision horizons. This means that 
a forward-looking fmn is one optimizing at any date before T-1. 
Because we will compare the risk-averse firm with an otherwise identical risk-neutral firm, 
we need to know the optimal behavior of the latter. It is straightforward to show that the risk-
neutral FOCs for any date preceding the tenninal timeT are 
and that the optimal sales policy at Tis given by PT = Iy (see Appendix B). It follows immediately 
from (1.12) and (1.13) that, in the risk-neutral context, optimal myopic and forward-looking sales 
are identical, therefore we will not distinguish between myopic and nonmyopic risk-neutral 
behavior. 
4We will assume for the remainder of the analysis that the solution to (1.3) and (1.4) exists. The 
conditions for this are given in Beruekas (1976, p. 375). 
5 According to Menon (1982, p. 656), the planning horizon "is the maximum length of time for which the 
investor gives any weight in his utility function," and the decision horizon is "the length of time between which the 
investor makes successive decisions. and is the minimum time between which he would take any action." 
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II. Myopic versus Forward-Looking Speculative Storage Behavior 
We can obtain comparative statics corresponding to the risk-averse finn by total 
differentiation of FOCs (1.10) and (1.11). The myopic and forward-looking responses of sales 
and storage to current price, beginning inventories, the degree of absolute risk aversion, the 
interest rate, and the parameters of the distribution of next-date price are summarized in 
Propositions 1 and 2, respectively. Note that we use the acronyms CARA, DARA, and IARA to 
denote constant, decreasing, and increasing absolute risk aversion, respectively. 
PROPOSmON 1: MYOPIC STORAGE AND SALES BEHAVIOR. For any positive amount 
stored, a myopic risk-averse firm behaves as follows: 
a) Safes: 
{
> 0 if CARA; or DARA and P0 ::; 0; or lARA and P0 ;;:: 0 
~ 0 if DARA and P 0 > 0; or lARA and P0 < 0 
{
> 0 if CARA; or DARA and Po P0 ::; i; or lARA and Po P0 :<: i 
~ 0 if DARA and Po P0 > i; or lARA and Po P0 < i 
{
< 1 if DARA 
= 1 if CARA 
> 1 if lARA 
()pO:T-1 
d~O;! a=l {
< 0 if DARA or CARA 
~ 0 if I ARA 
b) Storage: 
>0 
{
> 0 if DARA or CARA 
~ 0 if I ARA 
{
< 0 if CARA; or DARA and P0 ::; 0; or lARA and P0 :<: 0 
~ 0 if DARA and P0 > 0; or lARA and P0 < 0 
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{
< 0 if CARA; or DARA and Po P0 $ i; or lARA and Po P0 ~ i 
~ 0 if DARA and Po P0 > i; or lARA and Po P0 <. i 
{
> 0 if DARA 
= 0 if CARA 
<Oif/ARA 
arl=T 
oJ.l.o;J cr=l 
arl=T 
Clcr0;1 cr=l 
{
> 0 if DARA or CARA 
~ 0 if I ARA 
{
< 0 if DARA or CARA 
~ 0 if I A R A 
where: p1 = cr0,1 p1 + (1- cr0,1) J.l.o,J• cr0,1 =constant, J.l.o.J = E0(p 1) 
A.= Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (A=- M1"/M1') 
Proof" See Appendix C. 
Because storage (!1) is the "productive" activity of this speculative fum, Proposition 1 
reiterates the findings of the standard literature on the firm under uncertainty for the case of 
speculative storage. If the myopic firm is DARA or CARA, storage increases with higher expected 
price or smaller Rothschild-Stiglitz mean-preserving price spreacL Also, myopic storage is 
negatively related to the flrm's degree of absolute risk aversion. 
From Proposition 1, beginning stocks have a positive (negative) effect on storage if the 
firm is DARA (lARA). This result is to be expected: a ceteris paribus increase in beginning stocks 
makes the firm wealthier and therefore less absolute risk averse if DARA. But we know that 
storage is negatively associated to the degree of absolute risk aversion, so that storage grows when 
beginning stocks increase for a DARA firm. 
8 
The ambiguous response to current price in Proposition 1 seems counterintuitive. One 
would expect current price to affect storage negatively because current price may be considered an 
input price for storage. But a current price change also causes a wealth change and, consequently, 
a change in the degree of absolute risk aversion unless the fum is CARA. For the CARA firm, the 
degree of absolute risk aversion does not depend on current price and the storage response to 
current price is unambiguously negative. Also, the DARA fum that buys good to store (i.e., 
P 0 :;; 0) reduces storage as current price increases. Otherwise, DARA storage bears an ambiguous 
relationship with current price. A similar explanation can be given to the result regarding the 
interest rate in Proposition 1. 
When the fum is CARA the degree of absolute risk aversion is not affected by changes in 
exogenous variables. Therefore, the CARA firm's response to a change in a specific exogenous 
variable does not include the indirect effect of that variable on the degree of absolute risk aversion. 
For non-CARA fJTITIS, this indirect effect may be of opposite direction and sufficiently large so as 
to outweigh the exogenous variable direct effect, which is the reason for the ambiguities that arise 
from DARA or lARA attitudes in Proposition 1. Because of these ambiguities, non-CARA 
forward-looking behavior cannot be characterized without imposing more restrictions (see 
Proposition 2). 
PROPOSIDON 2: FORWARD-LOOKING STORAGE AND SALES BEHAVIOR. For any 
positive amount stored, the sales and storage responses of a forward-looking risk-averse firm to 
changes in current price, interest rate, beginning inventories, expected next-date price, mean-
preserving price spread, and degree of absolute risk aversion are ambiguous in general. If the firm 
is CARA, it behaves as follows: 
a) Sales: 
> o. > o. = 1, 
0"=1 
b) Storage: 
arl<T < o, 
i3Fo 
Proof" See Appendix C. 
~ 0, ~0 
cr=l 
When we constrain the forward-looking finn to be CARA, we obtain unambiguous 
responses to current price, interest rate, and beginning inventory. Moreover, these responses are 
qualitatively the same as for the myopic CARA finn. But the effect of next-date expected price, 
next-date Rothschild-Stiglitz mean-preserving price spread, and the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion on forward-looking sales and storage are ambiguous even for CARA. This result is 
counterintuitive and stands in contrast with what was found for the myopic case. This finding 
merits a more careful analysis because it challenges some of the main conclusions of the standard 
theory of the competitive finn under uncertainty. 
We can show that the ambiguous forward-looking response is a plausible characterization 
of real-world finn behavior. To explain this behavior, it is helpful to rewrite FOC (1.10) in terms 
of the covariance between prices and marginal utility. 6 If the finn stores something at the present 
date (e.g., 11 = I0 - P0 > 0), the Lagrangian multiplier must equal zero (T]0 = 0) and we can express 
(1.10) as 
(2.1) 
6Recall that for :J.llY pair of random variables x :J.lld y, E(x y) = E(x) E(y) + Cov(x. y). 
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On the other hand, if the firm stores nothing (!1 = Io- P0 = 0), the Lagrangian multiplier is positive 
Cllo <: 0), and instead of (2.1) we have 
(2.2) 
M 0' is always positive, and we can infer the sign of Cov(p 1, M1') in expressions (2.1) and (2.2) 
by examining the response of M1' to changes in p1, i.e., 
(2.3) 
+ · · · + { f [ f · · · f ( f MT' 
P2 P3 PT·! PT 
where MT" = U" and M," = E,(M1+1"), evaluated at the optimum, andpt+l(pt+llp1) is the 
conditional density function ofpt+l' given p,. The term (r1 ••. rT.t I1 M1") reflects the impact of 
current storage and is nonpositive. The term(- r1 ••• rT.t I2 M1 ")is due to the effect of next-date 
storage and is nonnegative. The third term in the right-hand side of (2.3) captures the impact of 
changes in absolute risk aversion and vanishes for a CARA decision maker. Finally, the 
integration terms represent the effect of next-date price attributable to its effect on posterior prices. 
Expressions (1.12) through (2.3) together with the following characterization of prices 
(2.4) p1 =a:+ l3 Pr.t + e,, 0 :S: l3 :S: 1, e, i.i.d. random variable 
give us the elements to derive our second set of results, which are summarized in Propositions 3 
and 4, and their respective Corollaries. 
PROPOSffiON 3: MYOPIC RESERVATION PRICE FOR STORAGE. The reservation price 
above which a myopic risk-averse firm does not srore is equal ro rhe reservation price for the risk· 
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neutral firm. A myopic risk-averse firm will store at a level at which discounted expected next-date 
price is higher than current price plus marginal storage cost. 
Proof" The risk-neutral reservation price is fu:r = E0(p 1)/r0 - i'(O); the proof is trivial from FOCs 
(1.12) and (1.13). 
For a myopic flnn, I2 = Ir +I = 0, and the right-hand side of (2.3) reduces to Ir Mr" ::; 0. 
Therefore, 
{
< 0 if Ir > 0 
(2.5) Cov(pr- Mr') = 0 if Ir = .0 
because Pr is monotonically increasing in Pr- and Mr' is monotonically n?nincreasing in Pr-7 
Applying expression (2.5) to (2.1) and (2.2) we get 
Hence, the myopic risk-averse reservation price is P;;:,r.J = E0(p 1)/r0 - i'(O) = P~r- Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY TO PROPOSmON 3. The myopic risk-averse firm stores less than does the risk-
neutral firm. 
PROPOSITION 4: FORWARD-LOOKING RESERVATION PRICE FOR STORAGE. ( 1) The 
reservation price above which a forward-looking risk-averse firm does not store is generally 
different from the risk-neutral or the myopic risk-averse reservation price. Moreover, this firm 
does not necessarily store an amount at which discounted expected next-date price is higher than 
current price plus marginal storage cost. 
iThis result is obtained by employing Theorem 43 in Hardy, Littlewood. and P6lya (1967). 
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(2) If che firm is CARA and prices behave as shown in expression (2.4 ), chen rhe forward-
looking reservation price is higher chan che risk-neutral or che myopic risk-averse reservation price. 
Proof: We will only show part (2) because it implies part (1). If the firm is CARA, aM1'fclP1 = 
aM/aP 1 = 0 by FOC. Therefore, with prices characterized by (2.4), expression (2.3) becomes 
But 1 <! [3 <! 0, (r,- [3) > 0, M,'' < 0, and I,<! 0. Therefore, if I1 = 0, we will have aM 1 '/ap1 = 0 
when I2 = 0 and [3 = 0, and aM 1'/ap 1 > 0 otherwise. It follows that Cov(p1, M1') > 0 unless 
E0 (I2) = 0 and [3 = 0, and the forward-looking CARA reservation price p~~~ is such that 
p~~ > E0(p 1)!r0 - i'(O) = P~T-l = P~r Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY TO PROPOSITION 4. If the firm is CARA and prices behave as shown in 
expression (2.4), there exists a range of current prices over which cheforward-looking CARAfirm 
scores more chan che risk-neucralfirm scores. 
Proposition 3 and its Corollary extend well-known results from the theory of the finn 
under uncertainty to the myopic speculative storage scenario. Proposition 4 and its Corollary 
contain some of the key findings of this paper and provide the intuition for the seemingly 
paradoxical results of Proposition 2. Comparison of Propositions 3 and 4 (and their respective 
Corollaries) reveals that relaxing the myopic assumption under uncertainty yields nontrivial 
differences in speculative storing behavior. 
Our results hold not only in the unrealistic case of independent prices (i.e., [3 = 0) but also 
in the realistic cases of random walk ([3 = l) and stationary autoregressive processes of order 1 
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(0 < ~ < 1). Moreover, the price behavior assumed [i.e., expression (2.4)] can be easily relaxed 
and still obtain the main results of Proposition 4 and its Corollary, i.e., that there exists a range of 
current prices over which the forward-looking CARA fum stores more than the risk-neutral fum 
stores. In the interest of space, however, we will not pursue further the characterization of price 
processes that lead to the main results of Proposition 4 and its Corollary. 
In passing, it is worth noting that in the forward-looking scenario we cannot use normally 
distributed prices to justify mean-variance analysis because terminal beginning inventory is random 
but not normally distributed. From Proposition 3, it follows that IT= 0 when the current price is 
greater than the myopic reservation price [i.e., when PT.1 > E.r.1 (pT)/rT.1 - i'(O)]. This result 
truncates the density function of tenninal wealth, making it a non-normal density. 
In Figures 1 and 2, we illustrate ihe key findings reported in Propositions 1 through 4. 
Figure 1 is drawn in storage-current price space, whereas Figure 2 is done in sales-current price 
space. In each figure, we depict the curves "myopic CARA," "forward-looking CARA," and 
"risk-neutral" to represent the hypothetical behavior of three fums assumed identical except for 
their planning horizons and risk artitudes. The slope of the storage curves for the CARA fmns is 
negative (see Propositions 1 and 2). Also, the CARA storage curves are steeper than the risk-
neutral curve, as inferred from the equations giving the storage response to current price (see 
Appendix C), i.e., 
(2.8) 
ill . ro ... 
<-p= 1 
where lxl represents the absolute value of x, and the superscripts CARA and rn stand for CARA 
and risk-neutral finns, respectively. 
As stated in Proposition 3, the risk-neutral and myopic CARA reservation prices are 
identical in Figures 1 and 2. Also, risk-neutral storage is always above myopic CARA storage. 
Current price (po) 
CARA 
PO<T-1 
0 
14 
-....... . forward-looking CARA 
-....... 
myopic CA~ '-....... ~ 
-.............. -....... 
-.............. -....... 
-.............. 
.... 
Figure L Storage behavior of risk-neutral, myopic CARA, and nonmyopic CARA finns 
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Current price (po) 
CARA 
PO<T-1 f----
0 
forward-looking CARA . / 
/ 
.,.......- ~picCARA 
Figure 2. Sales behavior of risk-neutral, myopic CARA, and nonmyopic CARA firms 
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Figures 1 and 2 represent the case in which conditions (a), (b), or (c) of Proposition 4 are met, so 
that the forward-looking CARA reservation price is greater than the risk-neutral reservation price. 
Because storage curves are negatively sloped, the forward-looking CARA firm stores more than a 
risk-neutral firm when current price is between the risk-neutral and the forward-looking reservation 
. (" ICARA 1rn _ O "f CARA rn ) M "f . . tl pnces 1.e., O<T-1 > --o<r = 1 PO<r. 1 >Po > PO<T . 1 oreover, 1 storage cost IS a smc y convex 
function (as depicted), forward-looking CARA storage will also exceed risk-neutral storage for 
some range of current prices less than the risk-neutral reservation price (i.e., I~~ > I~:T > 0 for 
some Po< P~r). 
When current price is between the forward-looking CARA and the risk-neutral reservation 
prices, we observe a decrease in forward-looking CAR..<\ storage as we reduce the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion from some posi:ive value to zero (i.e., as firms become risk neutral). This 
is the reason why forward-looking CARA storage may increase with the degree of absolute risk 
aversion. We can apply a similar reasoning to explain the ambiguous effect of next-date expected 
price and next-date Rothschild-Stiglitz mean-preserving spread on forward-looking CARA storage. 
From the proof of Proposition 4, it is clear that if current storage is sufficiently high we 
will have Cov(p 1, M 1 ') < 0 because the first term in the right-hand side of (2.3) will outweigh the 
other terms. Therefore, for sufficiently large current storage, we will have risk-neutral storage 
exceeding forward-looking CARA storage. Also, because of inequality (2.8), the forward-looking 
and risk-neutral curves intersect at a unique point These observations are illustrated in Figure 1. 
We can readily explain the apparent irrationality of a nonmyopic CARA fum holding 
inventories when current price is greater than discounted expected next-date price minus storage 
cost Let lo· t1, and tz be three arbitrary successive calendar times, and write the tenninal cash 
flow at dates to and t1 in the following way: 
= r [p L - p T - i(I )] + [p I - p I - i(I )] to to 'D to '11 11 'l 'l 'l '2 '2 
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At time lo· the planning horizon for the myopic firm ends at next date t1, so that T = t1• The 
myopic firm at date T-1 = 1o plans to sell its entire current storage at date T = t1• Therefore, at time 
1o the myopic fum only cares about revenue risk at t1 (i.e., p, I, ). In contrast, the forward-! 1 
looking fum's planning horizon ends after the next date, i.e., T > t1. Hence, the forward-looking 
fum generally expects to store something at t1 [i.e., Eto (I,2) > 0], in which case it faces cost risk 
[i.e., p,
1 
I
12 
+ i(I,
2
)] in addition to revenue risk from its activities at t1. But revenue and input cost 
risks are related to each other and to current storage. In particular, current storage increases 
revenue: risk but reduces input cost risk. The two opposing effects of current storage mean that the 
forward-looking fum may derive utility from holding some inventory, even when the one-period 
expected return from storage is negative. In a sense, the forward-looking fum diversifies assets 
interti:mporall y. 
The results in this section apply not only to fums speculating with commodity storage, but 
also to speculative holders of stocks, bonds, and other non transformable assets. These results are 
compatible with the findings of the standard theory of the firm under uncertainty because the 
standard results apply when the forward-looking firm stores a sufficiently large amount. But our 
model explains real-world facts that are incompatible with the standard model of the fum under 
uncertainty. For example, firms practice sequential marketing hold output and/or input reserves, 
and spread transactions over time to reduce risk (Robison and Barry, 1987, p. 65). 
To illustrate the preceding findings, consider the following example. Assume that the 
forward-looking CARA firm is at decision date T-2, which corresponds to calendar time to· Prices 
at calendar times t1 and tz (i.e., decision dates T-1 and T, respectively) have the following 
stationary discrete distribution: 
{ 
13 with probability 0.25 
(2.10) p, = 10 with probability 0.50 
7 with probability 0.25 
Therefore, Eto(p,
1
) = Eto(p,
2
) = E,
1 
(p,
2
) = 10, and Varto(p,
1
) = Var,
0
(p,
2
) = Var,
1 
(p,
2
) = 4.5. The 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion (71.) equals 0.001, and the storage cost function is quadratic 
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In addition, assume that the firm has no beginning inventories (I'o = 0) and that the interest rate is 
zero (i.e., r'D = r11 = !). 
The utility-maximizing storage level was obtained by numerical maximization of the 
expected value of utility. 8 Table 1 and Figures 3 through 5 summarize the key results. It can be 
observed in Table I that the forward-looking CARA reservation price is above the myopic CARA 
and the risk-neutral reservation prices. Also, forward-looking CARA optimum storage equals 
35.48 units when the current price is p'D = 9 (i.e., the myopic CARA reservation price). The 
expected profit from storing 35.48 units from date to to date t1 is -1.3 (i.e., a loss of 1.3). 
However, the forward-looking CARA expected utility at 11 = 35.48 equals -0.92875, which is I 
greater than the expected utility at 111 = 0 (expected utility in this instance is -I). The intuition for 
this result can be found in Figure 3, which shows the probability distribution of wealth at date 1:2 
for the forward-looking and myopic CARA firms, assuming that the current price is p'D = 9.9 
Given this current price, the myopic finn stores nothing at to· When date t1 arrives, if the myopic 
firm stays in business until date t, it will store when p1 = 7 (a 0.25 probability), and it will not 
- I 
store when p1 = 10 or 13 (a 0.75 probability). If the myopic firm stores at tl' there are three 1 
possible wealth outcomes: (i) a profit of 1,514 if p12 = 13, which has a 0.0625 (0.25 x 0.25) 
unconditional probability; (ii) a profit of 543 if p12 = 10 (a 0.125 unconditional probability); and 
(iii) a loss of 429 if p12 = 7 (a 0.0625 unconditional probability). In contrast, the forward-looking 
firm stores 35.48 units at to and behaves myopically at t1• Therefore, there are five possible wealth 
outcomes. The most likely outcome is a loss of 1.3 (a 0.5 probability), which occurs when 
p1 = 10. There is also a 0.25 probability that the firm will make a profit of 105 (when p1 = 13). I I 
Finally, if p,
1 
= 7 (a 0.25 probability), the forward-looking firm will lose 108 on its to storage but 
Swe used the utility function U =- exp(- A. Wy) so that utility values range between -I and 0. 
9To obtain the disnibution of wealth at date ~·we assumed that all three fums behave myopically m date 
t1 and that they store nothing at date 1:.· 
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Table 1. Example of a forward-looking CARA fum that stores more than do myopic CARA and 
risk-neutral fums 
Reservation price 
Optimum storage when 
p =9 
<o 
Maximum expected utility 
when p<o = 9 
Expected utility when 
p = 9 at T = 0 <o ..,! 
Forward-looking Myopic CARA Firm Risk-neutral Firm 
CARAFirm 
p,0 = 9.2177 
I,
1 
= 35.48 
-0.92875 
(at ~ 1 = 35.48) 
-1 
p =9 <o 
I,! =0 
-1 
(at ~ 1 = 0) 
-1 
p =9 
'o 
I = 0 
'1 
-1 
(at ~ 1 = 0) 
-1 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 r 
Probability 0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
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Figure 3. Probability distribution of wealth at date tz, assuming that current price is p'o = 9 
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Figure 4. Effect of mean-preserving price spread at date t1 on optimal forward-looking CARA 
storage for current price levels Pro = 9 and Pro = 7 
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Figure 5. Effect of coefficient of absolute risk aversion on optimal forward-looking CARA 
storage, assuming that current price is Pro = 9 · 
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it will store at tl' which may yield high or medium profits or a loss. The data in Figure 3 reveal 
that average wealth at~ is slightly lower for the forward-looking CARA compared to the myopic 
CARA fl.rm, but the standard deviation for the latter is considerably higher than for the former. 
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the mean-preserving price spread at date t1 and 
the optimal forward-looking CARA storage.IO The simulation shows the ambiguous effect of risk 
on storage. When p'o = 7, the firm expects to profit from storage and its response to risk is 
negative up to a mean-preserving spread of 4.5, i.e., it behaves like a myopic finn. The positive 
response to risk when the mean-preserving spread increases beyond 4.5 occurs because, by 
storing more from to to tl' the firm can take advantage of a high t1 price. This advantage is not 
symmetrically offset by the losses resulting from a low p, because a low t1 price creates profit 1 
opportunities to store from t1 to ~ (remember that the mean-preserving price spread change occurs 
only at t1 prices, which means that the~ price vector is 13, 10, and 7). When the to price is 9, the 
forward-looking firm stores more as risk increases up to a mean-preserving price spread of 9 and 
stores less thereafter. By increasing storage in response to an increase in the mean-preserving 
price spread, the finn effectively reduces the standard deviation of wealth at t.., compared to the 
siruation in which storage is either unchanged or reduced (see Figure 3). This example provides 
intuition for the positive correlation between storage and risk. 
Finally, Figure 5 shows that storage bears an ambiguous relationship to the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion. Risk-neutral finns store nothing at p, = 9. If we introduce a small degree 
0 
of risk aversion, then storage is optimal because it reduces the variance of terminal wealth (and 
reduces expected terminal wealth as well). However, there is a point at which additional storage 
increases risk; beyond this point, increased absolute risk aversion reduces storage in the traditional 
manner. 
!Of-or example, a me:m-preserving price spread of x units implies that p, equals (10 + x) with probability 
1 
0.25, 10 with probability 0.50. and (10- x) with probability 0.25. 
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III. The Case of a Productive Competitive Firm 
The main results discussed in the preceding section were obtained by assuming the cash 
flow presented in (1.2) and are attributable to the contemporaneous relationship between revenue 
and input cost at each date. In this section, we will show that similar conclusions apply to fums 
characterized by less restrictive cash flows. The complications that arise from allowing for random 
input prices in a nonmyopic context are attributable to the possibilities of stochastic production 
and/or input substitution. Hence, we can apply our basic model to other types of cash flows by 
constraining the production function to be nonstochastic and such that inputs with random prices 
cannot be substituted. 
Consider a competitive fum with a Leontief shan-run production function, 
where Q, denotes output at date t, Q, :<: 0, 0: represents material input use, <1> is a fixed input-
output coefficient (<1> > 0), v, is a vector of nonmaterial inputs, and q(·) is a concave production 
function. Output Q, becomes available for sale at date t+ 1, i.e., the production process starts at 
time t but output cannot be sold until date t+ L 
According to (3.1), adding <1> units of material input increases production by one unit over 
the range in which the vector of nonmaterial inputs does not constrain production. If enough units 
of material input are added, the set of nonmaterial inputs eventually becomes binding and 
production cannot increase. The fact that there is no substitutability between material input and 
q(·) does not mean that substitution among the nonmaterial inputs in vector V, is prevented. For 
example, it may be feasible to substitute capital for labor in wheat milling, even though the 
substitutability of wheat for either of these rwo nonmaterial inputs combined or alone is negligible 
for all practical purposes. Note also that material input becomes nonbinding as <1> tends to zero, 
resulting in a standard production function q(·). In other words, the standard production function 
is nested in (3.1). 
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For our purposes, it is essential that the Leontief function (3.1) is nonstochastic and that 
there is no substitution between material and nonmaterial inputs. This allows us to examine the 
situation for which material input price is random without complications arising from input 
substitution or stochastic output. Storage, transportation, refining and/or purifying of raw 
materials (e.g., oil, sugar, and metals), grain milling (e.g., wheat and rice), oilseed crushing, alloy 
preparation, energy generation, meat packing, and livestock production are examples of processes 
that comply with this type of production function. 
Diewert (1971) has shown that the cost function dual to (3.1) is 
where C is variable cost, s, is material input price, c(-) is a convex nonmaterial cost function such 
that c'O > 0, and v, is a vector of nonmaterial input prices. We will assume that nonmaterial 
input prices are constant, and we will simply write c(Q,) instead of c(Q,; v,) because we will not be 
concerned with nonmaterial input prices. Assuming that material input price is stochastic while 
nonmaterial input prices are constant can be justified because in many siruations the largest share of 
variable cost is due to the material input. In addition, nonmaterial input prices are generally less 
volatile, and substitutability among nonmaterial inputs should cause variable cost changes far less 
pronounced than those due to material input price changes. Hence, the cash flow corresponding to 
a nonstoring firm with the Leontiefproduction function (3.1) can be represented by 
Comparing (3.3) with (1.2) reveals that the latter is a special case of the former, in which <l> = 1, 
s, = p,, and I,+1 = Q, = 0:1<1>. 
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With random fmal product and material input prices, optimal production at the current date t 
= 0 is the ~that yields M 0[r0 •.. rT. 1 (r_ 1 W_ 1 + p0 Q 1); s0, Pol in the following set of recursive 
equationsll 
where: f-r = U(rT.1 WT.1 + PT QT.1 - <l> 5-r QT- c(QT)] 
£, = f f Mt+1[rt+1 ··· rT-1 (r, W, + Pr+1 Q,); Pt+1' 5t+1] g,+1(Pt+1' s,+11p,, s,) ds,+l dpt+l' 
Pt+l 5t+l 
O:>t<T-1 
The cash flows in expression (3.4) are as shown in (3.3), s,: (s0, ... , s1) is a vector containing 
past and current prices of material input, and g1+1(p1+1' s1+11 p" s1) is the conditional density 
function of s1+1 and p1+1' given (p1, s1). It is clear that optimal production at the terminal date Tis 
zero (QT = 0) and that the Kuhn-Tucker condition corresponding to any previous date is 
(3.5) 
With this basic setting, we can now derive Propositions 5 and 6, which are analogous to 
Propositions 3 and 4 for the productive firm. Note that in Proposition 6 we use the following 
expression regarding the relationship between output and material input prices: 
(3.6) s, = y + 8 p1 + u1, 8 ~ ~/<1>, u1 i.i.d. random variable 
where~ is the coefficient corresponding to the lagged output price in equation (2.4). 
11 Actually, this firm at date t must decide how much to sell from what was produced at the preceding date 
(Q1_1). how much to produce for s.1le at next date (Q1), and how much material input to use (O:l- But the firm will 
always sell all beginning stocks so long as current output price is positive and the firm cannot store. and optimal 
material input use is given by Q: = <!> Q1• Hence, the decision variable set reduces to Q1. 
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PROPOSmON 5: MYOPIC RESERVATION PRICE WITH PRODUCTION. The reservation 
price above which a myopic risk-averse firm does not produce is equal to the risk-neutral 
reservation price. A myopic risk-averse firm will produce at a level at which discounted expected 
next-date output price is higher than weighted current material input price plus marginal production 
cost. 
Proof: See Appendix D. 
COROLLARY TO PROPOSmON 5. The myopic risk-averse firm produces less than the risk-
neutral firm. 
PROPOSmON 6: FORWARD-LOOKING RESERVATION PRICE WITH PRODUCTION. 
( 1) If output and material input prices are positively related, the reservation price above which a 
forward-looking risk-aversefirm does not produce is generally different from the risk-neutral or 
the myopic risk-averse reservation price. Moreover, such a firm does not necessarily produce an 
amount at which discounted expected next-date output price is higher than weighted current 
material input price plus marginal production cost. 
(2) If the firm is CARA and that ourput and mate1ial input prices behave as in (2 .4) and 
(3 .6), the forward-looking reservation price is higher than the risk-neutral or the myopic risk-
averse reservation price. 
Proof: See Appendix D. 
COROLLARY TO PROPOSmON 6. If ourput and material input prices are represented by (2 .4) 
and (3 .6), there exists a range of current prices over which the CARAforward-looking firm 
produces more than the risk-neutralfinn produces. 
28 
The intuition for Propositions 5 and 6 is the same as that for the speculative storing firm. 
Again, our findings extend and qualify the standard results of the firm under uncenainty. For 
example, Proposition 6 explains the observed fact that in many instances firms continue producing 
even if they expect not to recover their variable costs over shan periods of time. 
The key to the behavioral hypotheses derived for the forward-looking CARA finn is the 
positive contemporaneous relationship between output and materiill input prices. The obvious 
question that arises is how strong and of what sign is that relationship in real-world situations. To 
this end, we repon in Table 2 the correlation coefficients for seven pairs of contemporaneous 
output and material input prices belonging to the U.S. agricultural marketing and farm sectors. It 
can be seen that in all cases output and input prices bear a positive relationship. Table 2 also 
shows that the output-material input price relationship may be too strong to be neglected a priori 
when analyzing the firm under uncenainty. 
Our results have implications for empirical work. First, the usual technique of a priori 
restricting the finn's production response to risk to be of the same sign at all production levels may 
be inappropriate. In fact, doing so may bias empirical results toward rejection of the hypothesis 
that risk affects finn behavior. This observation is supponed by empirical studies reponing that 
output price variance has a relatively low impact on production (e.g., Brorsen et aL 1985, 
Antonovitz and Roe 1986, Aradhyula and Holt 1989, Antonovitz and Green 1990), and that 
material input price has a relatively greater effect on production than does the expected output price 
(e.g., Antonovitz and Roe, Antonovitz and Green). Second, relaxing the myopic constraint seems 
relevant, given the recent developments toward allowing for both rational expectations and risk 
aversion (Aradhyula and Holt, Antonovitz and Green). Even though forward-looking behavior is 
not synonymous to rational expectations, the concept of rational expectations seems much more 
consistent with forward-looking than with myopic behavior. 
Our fmdings are also relevant for the study of business cycles. Forward-looking CARA 
firms tend to produce less than do risk-neutral ones at high output levels but more at low levels of 
production. Forward-looking CARA firms will therefore dampen the effects of business cycles. 
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Table 2. Coefficients of correlation between contemporaneous output and material input prices, 
1976:1-1987:12 
Output Material Input Coefficient of Correlation 
Wholesale beef Live beef 0.985b 
Meal Soybeans 0.942b 
Oil Soybeans 0.859b 
Slaughter steers Feeder steers 0.908b 
Eggs Egg feed 0.7 51 b 
Hogs Corn 0.368b 
Broilers Broiler grower feed o.ssob 
•The coefficients were estimated by using monthly data deflated by the Producer Price Index. 
bSignificant at 1 percent. 
Sources: Wholesale beef and live beef: Average prices of choice yield grnde 3 steers at leading marketing areas 
(USDA 1989). 
Soybeans: Price of No. 1 Yellow, lllinois processors (USDA various issues). 
Meal: Price of 44 percent protein, bulk,.FOB Decatur (USDA various issues). 
Oil: Price of crude, tanks, FOB Decatur (USDA various issues). 
Slaughter steers: Price of choice slaughter steers. 900 to 1.100 pounds, Omaha (USDA 1989). 
a 
Feeder steers: Price of medium-frame number one feeder steers, 600 to 700 pounds. Kansas City (USDA 
1989). 
Eggs, hogs. and broilers: Prices received by farmers (V/eimar and Cromer 1990). 
Egg feed: Egg feed costs (VIeimar and Cromer 1990). 
Corn: Prices calculated from the hog-<:orn ratio (VIeimar and Cromer 1990). 
Broiler grower feed: Prices paid by farmers (VIeimar and Cromer 1990). 
30 
IV. Conclusions 
A well-known result from the theory of the flnn under uncertainty is that a myopic risk-
averse fum produces less than does an otherwise identical risk-neutral flrm. Our analysis reveals, 
however, that this conclusion is due to the assumption of myopic behavior and/or lack of 
correlation between output and material input prices. If output and material input prices are 
contemporaneously correlated, a risk-averse forward-looking firm may produce more or less than 
will a risk-neutral fum. 
We show that there are realistic circumstances under which the forward-looking constant 
absolute risk-averse (CARA) fum will produce more than will a risk-neutral fum. In such 
instances, forward-looking CARA production exceeds risk-neutral output at low levels of ·-
production and the opposite is true at high production levels. 
The behavioral differences between myopic risk-averse and forward-looking CARA firms 
are attributable to the fact that the former cares only about revenue risk, whereas the latter is 
concerned about both revenue and input cost risks. The myopic flnn acts as if it intends to exit the 
market at the end of the current cycle and therefore disregards future costs. For such a flrm, the 
only risk effect of production is to increase revenue risk. In contrast, the forward-looking fum 
plans to stay in the market after the current production cycle and therefore it takes into account 
furure costs. Hence, for the forward-looking firm, current production not only increases revenue 
risk but also lowers cost risk if output and material input prices are positively related. Therefore, 
the forward-looking CARA firm may be willing to produce even if the one-period expected return 
from doing so is negative. 
The model introduced in this paper provides a rationale for stylized facts in 
microeconomics. For example, it explains why firms continue producing (or storing) in the shon 
run even at an expected loss and why farmers spread sales over time as a means to reduce risk. 
Our findings may also explain why empirical studies have found that the variance of output price 
has a relatively small impact on production. 
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Appendix A: Derivation of FOC (1.10) 
The FOCs corresponding to the Lagrangian function for 0 .$ t < Tare 
(Al) 
+ r, ... ry. 1 [p, + i"(·)] M,'(r,. 1 ... ry. 1 w,. 1• I,; p,)- Tl, = 0 
plus (1.11). Note that 
(A2) 
(A3) 
Also, 
(A4) 
(A4') 
C1M,(r,_ 1 ..• ry. 1 W,. 1, I,; p,) 
a I, 
where (A4') is obtained by using expressions (Al) through (A3). It follows from· (A4') that 
(A5) 
Substituting (A2) and (A5) imo FOC (Al) and rearranging yields expression (1.10). 
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Appendix B: Derivation of FOC (1.12) 
For the risk-neutral finn, the set of recursive equations is analogous to (1.3) and (1.4) but 
with Wr instead ofU(Wrl· Therefore, the FOCs corresponding to the terminal date Tare 
(Bl) Cif.r (p '') 0 
- = r +z -nr= 
C!Pr 
(B2) 
and optimal tenninal sales are Pr = Ir· For any period t < T, FOCs are as follows: 
(B3) 
plus (1.13). But (A2) and (A3) still apply, and the expressions analogous to (A4), (A4'), and 
(AS) are, respectively, 
(B4) 
(B4') 
(B5) 
CiM,(r,_1 ... rT-t W,_1, I,; p,) 
ar, 
= r, ... rT-1 P, 
CiMt+l(r, ... rT-1 W,, It+l; Pt+l) 
ar,+1 
Expression (1.12) is obtained by replacing (A2) and (B5) into FOC (B3). 
- r, ... rr-t i'(-) + Tl, 
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Appendix C: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 
The Lagrangian multiplier vanishes (110 = 0) if storage is positive (I1 = Ia- P0 > 0). 
Comparative statics can be obtained by totally differentiating FOC (1.10) as expressed in (Cl)l2 
aP £ 
and then calculating the effect of any variable x on sales as - 0 =- ::b.£ · • The derivatives of £p ax pp 
are:l3 
where Mr" = U" and M 1" = E1(M1+1 "),evaluated at the optimum. 
The sign ofE0 ([r0 (p0 + i')- p1] M1"} is ambiguous in general, but for CARA or myopic 
firms it can be inferred. For CARA firms we have 
12To make notation less cumbersome. in this section we use £p to denote a£;aP1• The me:l!ling of the 
remaining derivatives should be clear from the context. 
l3To simplify notation, whenever we refer to £p!i and £Pcr we assume they are evaluated at cr0.1 = I. 
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by FOC. Hence, £Pp = r0 M0' > 0, £Pr = (p0 + i') M0' > 0, and £p1 =- £pp > 0. Also, from 
~ > 0 it follows that ClP tfClp 1 ~ 0 for CARA. Then 
where Pk is a constant equal to P 1 when p1 equals [r0 (p0 + i')]. Expression (C9) is nonnegative 
because M1' > 0, and (Pk- P1) is positive (negative) whenever [r0 (p0 + i')- p1] is positive 
(negative). Therefore, £p11 ~ 0 even for the CARA firm. The sign of £Pcr is also ambiguous in 
general; for example, E0[(p 1 - ~. 1 ) M1'; = Cov(pl' M1') may be positive or negative for CARA 
forward-looking firms, as inferred from the proof of Proposition 4. 
For myopic firms, we have date 0 = T-1 and P 1 =IT= I1. Therefore, 
where~ is a constant equal to A. when p1 equals [r0 (p0 + i')]. The sign of (ClO) follows because 
M1' > 0, and for DARA (~-A.) is positive if [r0 (p0 + i')- p1] is negative, and vice versa. For 
IARA we have (A..,- A.) positive (negative) when [r0 (p0 + t)- p1] is.positive (negative). 
Therefore, for a myopic firm we have 
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(Cl3) £Pp {
> 0 if DARA and P 0 S: 0; or if lARA and P0 <: 0 
~ 0 if DARA and P0 > 0; or if lARA and P0 < 0 
(Cl4) £p,. {
> 0 if DARA and Po P0 S: i; or if IARA and Po P0 <: i 
~ 0 if DARA and Po P0 > i; or if IARA and Po P0 < i 
{
< - £pp if DARA 
(C15) £PI > - £pp > 0 if IARA 
{
< 0 if DARA or CARA 
(Cl 6) £p~ ~ 0 if IARA 
{
> 0 if DARA or CARA 
(Cl?) frcr ~ 0 if IARA 
To show the effect of the degree of absolute risk aversion on the myopic ftrm, take two 
fmns A and B such that 'J...A\W) > !...8 \W) for all W.14 Rewrite FOC corresponding to firm A as: 
r 0(p0+t) 
(C18) f 
0 
where Wk is terminal wealth corresponding to p1 = r0 (p0 + i') andp 1(p1) is the density function of 
p1• Equality (C18) is satisfied at firm A's optimum sales level (P0A). For fmn B, a similar 
expression to (C18) evaluated at P0A is 
r,(p,+r) 
(Cl9) f 
0 
14This proof follows Holthausen's methodology (1979). 
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Negativity of expression (C19) can be proven as follows. Subtract (C18) from (C19) to get 
(C20) 
The greater the next-date price, the greater terminal wealth because the finn is myopic. Hence, 
Wk > WT in the fl.rst integral and Wk < WT in the second integral. Applying inequality (20) in Pratt 
(1964, p. 129), it follows that the term involving ratios is negative in the first integral and positive 
in the second. Also, the term [r0 (p0 + i')- p1] is positive in the first integral and negative in the 
second. Therefore, both integrals are negative, (C20) is negative, and (C19) must be negative. 
We conclude that firm B's optimum sales (P08) must be lower than P0A because flilTl B's FOC is 
negative when evaluated at P0A. Hence, for myopic firms we have P0A > P08 iLl .. A> 1..8 . 
The degree of absolute risk aversion has an ambiguous effect on forward-looking sales, 
even for CARA flilTls. This is shown in the simulations at the end of this section (e.g., Figure 5). 
Comparative statics for storage follow by applying the identity ~+l = ~- P,. 
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Appendix D: Proof of Propositions 5 and 6 
We will outline the proofs of Propositions 5 and 6 because they can be performed by 
employing the same techniques we used to show Propositions 3 and 4, respectively. 
We may express FOC (3.5) in covariance terms as 
(Dl) 
E0(M 1'1 p1) is the conditional expectation of M1', given pi' and s1 (s 11 s0, p1) denotes the 
conditional densiry function of sl' given (s0, Pj). Expression (Dl) is analogous to (2.1) and (2.2) 
for the risk-averse productive firm. Similarly, a risk-neutral productive finn is characterized by: 
(D2) {= r0 [ci> s0 + c'(Q 0)] if Q0 > 0 Eo(pt) ::;; r0 [ci> s0 + c'(O)] if Q0 = 0 
For a myopic risk-averse decision maker, we have E0(M1'1 p1) = MT'· and 
Therefore, 
{< 0 if QT l > 0 (D4) Cov(pT, MT') = 0 if QT ~ l = 0 
Proposition 5 follows immediately by noting that (D4) is analogous to (2.5). 
For a nonrnyopic CARA finn with output and material input prices that behave as in (2.4) 
and (3.6), we have 
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(D5) 
The proof of Proposition 6 is straightforward because [r1 ... rT·l <Jo EaCM 1"1 p 1)] is negative if 
<Jo > 0 and zero if <Jo = 0, whereas the other terms in the right-hand side of (D5) are nonnegative. 
